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By Colonel Peter Murphy and Major Gerard Fogarty, 
Australian Army Psychology Corps.
I
t is generally accepted that soldiers need 
to be mentally prepared to perform well 
on operations.  But there is little 
agreement on how commanders can best 
prepare the individual soldier and the unit for 
deployment.  This article examines the 
antecedents of psychological readiness in 
several Australian military units at the time of 
Operations WArDEN and TANAGEr.  The 
interrelationships among human factors that 
predict individual and group psychological 
readiness are explored.  These factors include 
operational experience, health behaviours, 
morale, cohesion, the behaviour of the 
immediate commander, and perceptions of 
leadership effectiveness.  Initially, a review of 
the construct of psychological readiness is 
provided.
defining readiness
individual readiness.  There are broad 
definitions of psychological readiness that 
encompass factors such as physical and 
mental fitness, unit cohesion, commitment to 
the organisation, self-reported preparedness 
to deploy, and assessed technical competence 
(both job-related and broader military skills).  
However, this article has adopted a simple 
definition: Individual readiness is the “extent 
to which an individual is prepared, able, and 
motivated to perform his or her job as part of 
the larger military mission” (Harris, Blair, & 
O’Neill, 199, p. iii). 
collective readiness.  There is a second 
critical dimension of psychological readiness: 
collective readiness.  Just because the 
individual soldier may feel ready for 
operations dos not mean that he or she will 
feel the unit is ready — and vice versa.  
Collective readiness refers to the individual 
soldier’s beliefs about the ability of his or her 
work group or unit to be effective on 
operations.  
It is assumed often that the individual 
soldier’s sense of his or her own operational 
readiness will predict or strongly influence 
their impression of the unit’s readiness to 
deploy.  However, there is evidence that 
perceptions of collective readiness are more 
likely to influence the soldier’s own sense of 
readiness than the other way around.  
good to go? 
The human dimensions of mission readiness
General Yigal Allon,  
The Making of Israel’s Army, 1970
Battle is more than a 
combination of fire and 
movement.  It is the 
integration of fire, movement, 
and consciousness.  The 
commander, therefore, cannot 
rest content with guiding 
the fire and directing the 
movement; he must guide the 
soldier’s mental reactions to 
battle.  Hence the commander 
is responsible for the mental 
preparation of his men no less 
than for their physical and 
technical training and their 
being brought to battle.
Well, it’s a funny thing actually.  You kind of want to go very 
much but then you think about all the rest of it and then you 
have your doubts (about) one thing after another — what 
you’ll do and how you’ll perform.  The greatest battle I think 
the soldier has to perform is actually waiting to go.  It is a 
queer thing to say, but the thing that’s always in the soldier’s 
mind is: “how will I go?”  
And it doesn’t matter where or how or what distance in 
between actions; it always comes back to the night before 
— the first shot, how will they go in this, will they stand up, 
or will they do something silly or something like that?  Let 
your mate down or something.  You don’t know and that’s 
always in the soldier’s mind, I think, and it’s a question that 
every soldier, big, small, indifferent, has to answer.  
And he can’t answer that until he fronts up. He can’t say I 
proved meself there or I proved meself there. He can’t prove 
himself until the time comes and it’s always in the back of his 
head is that question, how will I go?  And that’s it.
Ted Kenna, VC, Infantry, New Guinea, WWII 
Voices of War, 2006
On 15 May 1945, PTE Kenna was involved in an action near Wewak, New 
Guinea, during which he exposed himself to heavy fire, killing a Japanese 
machine gun crew and making it possible for his company’s attack to 
succeed. For this he was awarded the Victoria Cross. Three weeks later he 
was shot in the mouth and spent more than a year in hospital before being 
discharged from the AIF in December 1946. 
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Airborne regiment in Somalia is compelling 
reading (Winslow, 1997).
COMMAnd LeSSOn 3: 
An inaccurate understanding of unit 
climate factors such as psychological 
readiness for operations can result in 
unexpected and adverse mission 
outcomes.
modelling readiness 
An early model of military readiness from 
the Canadian Forces (Wild, 1988) postulated 
that the human components of operational 
readiness rested on several psychological 
components, including confidence, 
proficiency (achieved through training and 
experience), and understanding of and 
motivation toward combat missions.  
Each of these components was presumed 
to be influenced by aspects of leadership, 
such as leadership behaviours, perceptions 
of leadership competence, and perceptions 
of genuine concern by leaders for personnel 
under their command.  The model provided a 
means to predict operational effectiveness 
using individual- and group-level factors (see 
Figure 1).
Fostering readiness
Bartone and Kirkland (1991) distilled three 
themes from the literature regarding 
command approaches to promoting 
psychological readiness.  These themes 
were: 
demonstrated care for subordinates  
by superiors, 
the fostering of trust and other emotional 
bonds across ranks to enhance cohesion, 
and 
the empowerment of subordinates in 
order to nurture initiative when 
confronted with the unexpected or novel 
challenges which commonly occur during 
the ‘fog of war’ (i.e., the uncertainty 
typically surrounding the conduct of 
actual operations).  
The military literature suggests that the 
priorities, values and behaviour of 
1.
2.
3.
commanders have a strong influence on the 
psychological readiness of subordinates.  
Outcomes from leadership studies in the 
civilian sector have suggested that proximal 
leadership (the commander immediately 
above in the chain of command) is normally 
the most important influence on subordinate 
behaviour.  
However, in the context of the military, the 
most influential level of leadership in 
relation to readiness perceptions does not 
appear to have been consistently identified.  
It seems that in certain circumstances, 
senior leadership can be just as — or more — 
influential.
Readiness and effectiveness
The premise that psychological readiness 
is important to operational effectiveness 
was examined by Kirkland, Bartone and 
Marlowe (1993).  In their study, leader 
behaviour was considered an expression of 
command priorities.  leader behaviour was 
postulated to have the potential to affect the 
self-esteem and commitment of 
subordinates by promoting a positive 
psychological climate of trust and concern. 
The overall impact of such responses to 
command was presumed to constitute the 
elements of psychological readiness 
and other human factors within a unit.  
Psychological readiness, along with 
factors such as morale and 
cohesion, in turn, would impact on 
military performance.  A flowchart 
of these postulated relationships 
is shown in Figure 2.
Readiness and 
morale
A number of studies 
have regarded 
psychological readiness 
as an important 
component of morale.  Shamir 
et al. (2000) believed that the 
individual soldier’s sense of combat 
readiness was based on his or her 
beliefs about the ability of the group 
or unit to be effective on operations.  
If the soldier held strong and positive beliefs 
about his team or unit’s operational 
effectiveness, this presumably would 
influence their attitudes and behaviour; 
including how much effort is put into group 
tasks and the degree of persistence that 
occurs when group efforts do not deliver 
expected outcomes.  Most definitions of 
morale contain these specific behaviours (ie., 
effort (motivation) and 
persistence 
(commitment) to 
group goals).
Command Command Subordinate Increased  Increased
priorities behaviour perceptions subordinate         psychological 
regarding  to execute of a caring, self-esteem, readiness,
human priorities trusting organisational morale and 
dimensions  leader commitment cohesion
Figure 2.  Flowchart of the relationship between command priorities and human dimensions outcomes in subordinates. (Adapted from Kirkland, Bartone and Marlowe (1993))
If soldiers are convinced that their team or unit 
would perform well on operations, this appears to 
bolster their own sense of readiness, increase 
how much effort is put into group tasks, and 
augment the degree of persistence when group 
efforts do not deliver expected outcomes.
COMMAnd LeSSOn 1: 
A sense of collective readiness in the 
team or unit is likely to promote higher 
levels of individual readiness.
In an Israeli Defence Force study (Shamir, 
Brainin, Zakay, & Popper, 2000), beliefs about 
collective readiness in combat units were 
examined.  Out of a range of variables (soldier 
experience levels, leader tenure in the current 
unit, leader confidence in the unit, soldier 
confidence in leadership, unit discipline levels, 
and identification with the unit) the strongest 
predictor of perceived combat readiness was 
identification with the unit.  unit identification 
has been called variously ‘vertical cohesiveness’, 
‘vertical bonding’ and ‘organisational cohesion’, 
but most commonly in the military it is known as 
esprit de corps.
COMMAnd LeSSOn 2:  
There is evidence that Esprit de Corps is 
a powerful predictor of collective 
readiness for combat.
measuring readiness
Military organisations have well-established 
procedures for gauging the preparedness of units 
for deployed operations.  Such readiness 
evaluations typically include assessments of unit-
level tactical proficiency, equipment serviceability 
checks, manning levels, audits of logistic stocks 
and supply processes, and reviews of each unit 
member’s individual readiness status (typically 
medical, dental, and weapons test compliance).  
Yet, despite recognition by military leaders 
throughout history that the human dimensions of 
capability are crucial to operational effectiveness, 
formal assessments of the psychological aspects 
of readiness appear to be the exception rather 
than the norm in today’s military forces.  This 
neglect may be explained partly by the 
uncertainty surrounding which factors impact 
upon psychological readiness and how they 
influence one another.  In short, how do we 
measure psychological readiness and what best 
predicts it? 
The importance of assessing readiness at 
different levels in the military was demonstrated 
by Shamir, Brainin, Zakay, and Popper (2000), 
who found that perceptions of readiness at the 
soldier level were only modestly correlated with 
perceptions at the level of instructional staff.  
The authors concluded that the two groups 
employed different standards to assess the 
combat readiness of units.  
The danger of different perceptions of 
readiness operating across levels of an 
organisation has been tragically demonstrated 
by incidents of indiscipline and atrocious 
behaviour on the part of deployed military 
personnel.  Donna Winslow’s socio-cultural 
analysis of the behaviour of the Canadian 
Bert Ferres and Bill 
Walmsley were acutely 
aware that at long last 
they might be able to see 
some of the action that 
they had so long been 
hungering for.  They had 
engaged in heavy training 
for nearly a year now, 
felt ready to handle the 
Germans’ best punches 
and throw a few of their 
own, and they wanted it 
to be now.  Bert, though 
he felt confident in his own 
right, knew big Bill was 
as game as a bull ant, and 
drew added strength from 
the fact that, if it came to 
it, they would be fighting 
shoulder to shoulder.  
Real soldiers — not just 
pretend ones who had 
only training without ever 
actually fighting.
Figure 1. Wild’s Human Dimensions of Combat 
Readiness Schema.
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Inconsistent findings exist with 
respect to the impact of personal/
operational tempo on outcomes 
such as performance, family well-
being, and readiness.  In addition, 
psychological readiness has been 
found to differ at the individual level 
compared to the collective level 
(Shamir et al., 2000).
an australian army 
study
The results that follow are drawn 
from the Human Dimensions of 
Operations project designed and 
coordinated by the Defence Force 
Psychology Organisation. The five 
units represented were surveyed 
before or during deployment to East 
Timor as part of Operation WArDEN 
(there were three predeployment 
samples and two deployed samples).  These 
units were comprised mainly of combat arms 
employment categories; hence females were 
not proportionally represented.  ‘Individual 
readiness’ and ‘Collective readiness’ were 
measured using multiple items drawn from a 
broader measure of unit climate (Murphy, 
2008).  The items used for these variables 
are contained in Table 1.
does military experience 
predict readiness?
Military experience did not prove to be a 
useful measure of individual readiness.  
Although Years of Service was significantly 
correlated with Individual readiness (r = .127, 
p<.0), a subsequent regression model 
showed that this was of little practical 
significance because only a small amount 
(2. per cent) of variation in Individual 
readiness scores was explained.  The lack of 
influence of Operational Experience was 
probably due to the restricted response 
range for this variable for this sample – over 
90 per cent of respondents had either no or 
one previous tour. We therefore refain from 
making inference about the role of military 
experience in other contexts.
 COMMAnd LeSSOn 7:  
On its own, depending on the 
background of the sample, military 
experience may not be a useful 
predictor of individual readiness.
do psychological and physical 
health predict individual 
readiness?
A second research question looked at 
whether higher levels of self-reported 
psychological and physical health would 
predict higher individual readiness. Four 
measures of psychological and physical 
health were examined.  These were ‘Medical 
Visits’ — the number of medical visits in the 
preceding 6 weeks, ‘Sleep hours/day’ — 
average number of hours per day of sleep 
over the previous seven days, number of 
‘Exercise sessions in the previous week’, and 
a total scale score for self-reported ‘Health 
Symptoms.’  
In light of uS findings that married 
soldiers reported significantly more positive 
experiences in their work and family lives, 
‘Marital Status’ was also examined.  Finally, 
in recognition of the significant body of 
research showing gender differences in 
health and wellness behaviours and health 
outcomes, gender was also examined.
Three of these variables proved to be 
significantly correlated with readiness; and 
the same three emerged as significant 
predictors in regression analyses.  Most 
notably, lower levels of self-reported health 
symptoms were associated with higher 
individual readiness.  Secondly, higher 
reported frequency of physical exercise 
predicted higher levels of readiness.  Gender 
was also predictive, with males reporting 
higher levels of readiness than females (the 
reasons for this gender difference remain 
unexplained; and the small proportion of 
females in this predeployment sample (.8 
per cent) means this result must be 
regarded tentatively).  
The regression analyses explained about 
11 per cent of the variation in Individual 
readiness scores in the two samples 
examined (one predeployment, one during 
deployment). The outcome for the 
regression analysis with a predeployment 
sample is shown in Figure 3.  The figures on 
the six pathways from the health-related 
variables at left to the predicted variable of 
individual readiness at right show the 
strength of the relationship (which can range 
from –1.0 to + 1.0), with boldface font 
indicating a statistically significant 
relationship.  The curved paths on the left 
between the health-related variables show 
correlation coefficients.  The figure above 
the ‘Individual readiness’ variable shows the 
amount of explained variance.
That frequency of exercise was associated 
with higher individual readiness is not 
unexpected.  Physical fitness is considered 
an important component of military 
performance.  Having exercise as a part of 
one’s daily routine may reflect the degree of 
commitment one has to the broad ideals of 
military service, and in turn, one’s 
perceptions of readiness for operational 
service.  
COMMAnd LeSSOn 8: 
Health-related variables, particularly 
health symptoms and frequency of 
exercise, are useful predictors of 
readiness at the individual level.  
unit climate factors as 
predictors of individual 
readiness 
The unit climate constructs of Morale, 
Cohesion, Motivation, and Proximal leader 
Behaviour (i.e., the respondent’s immediate 
leader, or next in the chain of command) 
were used next to predict Individual 
readiness.  All were significantly correlated 
with Individual readiness.  A regression 
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Figure 3.  Multiple regression predicting 
individual readiness from six health-related 
variables. (Predeployment Sample 1, n=369)
Kirkland, Bartone and 
Marlowe (1993) also featured 
morale in their research into 
psychological readiness. 
  They examined command 
priorities in u.S. Army units.  
By comparing soldier 
perceptions in units 
distinguished by low or high 
command priority with respect 
to fostering morale, significant 
correlations were found with 
six soldier readiness variables: 
commitment to the company, 
vertical bonding, confidence in 
leadership, general well-being, 
confidence in both self and 
weapons, and work 
satisfaction.  
In their study, other 
command priorities (combat 
skills, discipline, decisiveness, 
control, horizontal bonding 
(cohesion), and vertical bonding (esprit)) had 
almost no relationship with readiness 
variables.  It was concluded that the 
fostering and maintenance of morale are 
associated with high scores on a number of 
human dimension outcomes, particularly 
psychological readiness.  
COMMAnd LeSSOn 4: 
Units with the highest sense of 
readiness for operations are likely to 
have commanders who put a high 
priority on issues of subordinate 
morale.
Readiness and tempo
Another approach to understanding 
psychological readiness was taken by Castro 
and Adler (2000); wherein soldier readiness 
to perform was posited to be associated with 
the pace or tempo of military operations.  It 
was argued that a high operational tempo 
would lead to issues related to chronic 
fatigue and preclude adequate respite to 
enable military personnel to be adequately 
prepared — mentally or physically — “for 
some experience or action” (p. ).  
This research showed that the context of 
military activity had important implications 
for understanding the relationships between 
factors affecting psychological readiness.  
For instance, both training and deployment 
environments typically produce an increase 
in workload and hours of work for military 
personnel.  While soldiers assessed during 
deployment reported, as a group, decreased 
military readiness; soldiers assessed in 
training environments typically reported 
increased military readiness.  This distinction 
was subsequently explained by the high role 
ambiguity — “role overload” — associated 
with actual operations but normally absent 
from training scenarios (Thomas, Adler, & 
Castro, 200).
Other studies have examined the impact 
on readiness of the type of military 
operations undertaken.  For example, special 
forces personnel have reported decreases in 
readiness following non-combat duties such 
as embassy support.  rumsey (2002) 
concluded that peacekeeping duties were 
associated with tangible reductions in 
readiness for conventional operations.  
Excessive time on particular tasks such as 
training exercises and equipment 
inspections has also been associated with 
degraded readiness (Fossen, Hanser, & 
Stillion, 1997).  It should be noted that the 
construct of readiness in these studies was 
related to system-level factors such as 
disruptions to immediate work team 
composition, equipment wear and tear, and 
lack of training for certain military skills; 
rather than related to psychological 
readiness per se. 
Not all studies have found that 
psychological readiness is impaired by 
factors such as operational tempo.  For 
example, Adlerks (1998) found a neutral 
association between time away from 
garrison for training and perceptions of 
individual or unit readiness.  More 
significantly, several studies have found 
positive associations between operational/
personal tempo and perceptions of 
individual readiness (e.g., Castro & Adler, 
2001; ramsberger & Wetzel, 1998).  
While Castro and Adler (2001) found that 
sustained operational tempo can lead to an 
increase in operational readiness, they noted 
that this apparently positive outcome came 
at a cost — that of decreased family well-
being.  This decline in “family readiness” was 
presumably due to the extended absence of 
the Service member from home.
COMMAnd LeSSOn 5: 
High operational tempo/deployment 
workload have inconsistent impacts 
on readiness; possibly due to 
differences in leadership, levels of 
fatigue and degree of clarity about 
one’s operational role.
COMMAnd LeSSOn 6: 
Operational readiness can be inversely 
related to family satisfaction — finding 
the balance is important because 
family well-being is a major retention 
factor.
In summary, numerous social and 
psychological variables have been 
postulated, or have been found, to predict 
psychological readiness.  These variables 
include deployment appraisals and 
expectations, morale, cohesion, immediate 
leader behaviour, perceptions of leadership 
effectiveness, trust in leadership, 
commitment to the unit, esprit de corps, 
general well-being, level of military 
experience, and individual coping ability 
(Thompson & Pastò, 2003).  
individual Readiness  
Factor items
collective or group  
Readiness Factor items
I am ready to perform effectively if 
sent to war.
The members of my workteam/section/
patrol are ready to deploy on operations 
other than war.
I am ready to deal with any demand 
or situation that may arise during 
operational service.
My unit is ready for deployment on 
operations other than war.
I am prepared to risk my life for the 
members of my workteam.
The members of my workteam/section/
patrol are ready to go to war.
My unit is ready for its wartime role.
Table 1.  Items used to derive the Individual and Collective Readiness Factors.
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including a higher order ‘unit Climate’ 
variable designed to capture what the three 
human factors variables had in common. 
In structural equation modelling (SEM) 
terms, this component is referred to as a 
“measurement model”. The rest of the figure 
is called the “structural model” and is 
equivalent to regression where one is 
interested in prediction. The measurement 
model and the structural model can be 
tested separately or together, in which case 
good fit implies that both components are 
supported. We used the one-step approach. 
Outcomes for the modified model are shown 
as Figure 5.  The statistical fit of the model 
was acceptable.  The amount of variance in 
readiness scores explained by the model was 
a reasonable 22 per cent.  This outcome 
provided strong support for the higher order 
‘unit Climate’ factor shown in Figure 5 (the 
measurement model) and also for the other 
pathways shown (the structural model).   
The model also fitted data from a 
deployment sample. Considerably more 
variance was explained in Individual 
readiness (43 per cent compared with 22 
per cent).  For the deployment sample, the 
direct effect of Military Experience on 
Individual readiness was not significant (p = 
.24) but the direct effect of the unit Climate 
variable was much stronger (path 
coefficient .64 compared with .36 for the 
predeployment sample).  
collective readiness
The influence of the same human factors 
on collective readiness was examined next.  
Because it was reasoned that the military 
experience and healthy behaviours variables 
from the preceding model would not 
influence perceptions of group readiness, 
these individual biographic variables were 
omitted.  The higher order unit Climate 
variable (derived from Morale, Cohesion and 
Proximal leader Behaviour variables) was 
again used, and it accounted for 74 per cent 
of the variance in Collective readiness — an 
impressive outcome.  It would appear that 
human factors are even better predictors of 
perceptions of readiness of the respondent’s 
workteam and unit.
COMMAnd LeSSOn 10: 
Unit climate (as measured by cohesion, 
morale and immediate leadership) is a 
powerful predictor of soldier 
perceptions of the readiness of their 
workteam and unit for deployment.
group perceptions of 
readiness for deployment 
A final set of analyses was conducted 
using human factors derived from group-
level responses to the unit Climate Profile — 
rather than responses from individuals.  
These factors were designed to measure 
how military groups — such as platoons — 
perceived the climate in their untis.  The 
variables used were Ethos, Team Climate, 
Senior leadership Effectiveness and SNCO/
WO Effectiveness.  The latter two variables 
were intended to represent perceptions of 
higher-level leader effectiveness in the unit.  
Ethos was intended to measure 
organisational cohesion or Esprit de Corps.  
Given the presumed importance of morale to 
collective military performance, a morale 
factor was also included.  A group-level 
measure of readiness — called ‘readiness for 
Deployment’ — combined all items listed in 
Table 1.
The model is shown in Figure 6.  Five 
samples were used in separate regression 
analyses.  The combination of human 
dimensions variables explained between 48.1 
and 6.6 per cent of the variation in 
readiness scores across the samples.  There 
was remarkable consistency in the salience 
of the predictor variables.  For instance, 
Team Climate made the strongest unique 
contribution in four of the five samples and 
was the second strongest predictor in the 
other sample (the one shown in Figure 6).
Both Ethos and SNCO/WO leadership 
variables were significant predictors in all 
but one (predeployment) sample.  Senior 
leader Effectiveness and Individual Morale 
were less consistent predictors; significant in 
two samples each. It is noteworthy that 
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Figure 5. Model with higher order Unit Climate factor 
examining the influence of military experience, health 
behaviours, and human factors on Individual Readiness 
(n=363).
analysis (shown in Figure 4) revealed that 
the human factor variables explained an 
impressive 20.7 per cent of the variation in 
Individual readiness scores.  Interestingly, 
in the presence of the other human factors 
variables, Morale did not contribute 
significantly to explaining the variance in 
Individual readiness. Such outcomes are 
common when the independent variables in 
a regression equation are themselves 
correlated. In practical terms, these 
regression results are telling us that if we 
could measure just three of these four 
variables, Motivation, Proximal leader 
Behaviour, and Cohesion are the ones to 
use.
The same regression model was used with 
the two other predeployment samples and 
the variance explained in Individual 
readiness was even better: 49.1 per cent and 
32.6 per cent respectively.  The pattern of 
relationships among the variables varied, 
for example, for the second predeployment 
sample, Motivation made the largest unique 
contribution towards explaining Individual 
readiness, with Proximal leadership 
emerging as the other significant predictor.  
For the third sample, Motivation and 
Cohesion each significantly contributed to 
the prediction of psychological readiness. 
We can see that the relative contribution 
of each of the three human factors variables 
changed over the three samples but this 
“shuffling of the pack” is more a function of 
the instability of regression coefficients 
when the input variables are correlated, as 
they are here. The important point is that 
these three variables consistently predicted 
a substantial proportion of readiness.
COMMAnd LeSSOn 9: 
Human factors such as cohesion, 
motivation and immediate leadership 
were consistent and strong 
predictors of individual psychological 
readiness among ARA soldiers 
poised for deployment.
What of the role of morale? Morale did not 
influence readiness in any sample but this 
again is a function of the correlations among 
morale, motivation, cohesion, and proximal 
leadership. We know from the correlation 
coefficients, which are not reported here, 
that morale is related to readiness and that 
in two of the samples readiness was actually 
more strongly related to morale than to 
proximal leadership. Sometimes it is 
important to separate the theoretical and 
practical aims of research. From a theoretical 
point of view, our research has shown that 
all four of these human factors variables are 
related to readiness. From a practical point 
of view, we have shown that to predict the 
proportion of readiness accounted for in our 
analyses, you need to measure only three of 
them. To improve prediction, new variables 
must be introduced, or new techniques 
applied, as we will demonstrate in the 
remainder of this article. 
modelling individual 
Readiness
The broad constructs from the preceding 
analyses — military experience, health 
behaviours, and human dimensions factors — 
were combined into a model that examined 
their influence on individual readiness.  In 
this model, military experience comprised 
three items: age, operational experience, and 
years of service; and a health behaviours 
Figure 4. Multiple regression predicting individual readiness from morale, motivation, proximal leader behaviour, and cohesion. 
(Predeployment Sample 1, n=369)
index also comprised three items: exercise 
sessions per week, average working hours per 
day over the preceding week, and smoker/non-
smoker status.  
The Health Symptoms variable was excluded 
because it was considered to represent a 
health outcome rather than a health-related 
behaviour.  Examination of correlations 
suggested that morale and motivation 
appeared to be measuring the same construct, 
and because motivation was of secondary 
interest, it was removed from the model. 
Making use of our knowledge that the other 
three human factors variables were also 
correlated in all three samples (see comments 
above), we modelled this shared variance by 
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the workteam/unit level were the most compelling.  
This finding that collective readiness could be better 
accounted for than individual readiness suggests that 
psychological readiness is more than just a sense of 
confidence in one’s own military skills (self-efficacy).  It 
would appear that soldiers can and do distinguish 
multiple levels of readiness (e.g., individual, team, and 
unit); reflecting the importance of individual and 
collective performance in the military.
Self-reported psychological and physical health also 
showed considerable promise as useful predictors of an 
individual’s sense of preparedness for deployment. 
The practical implications of these findings are that 
psychological readiness can be modelled meaningfully 
using constructs derived from the Human Dimensions 
of Operations project, particularly the psychological 
climate constructs measured by the unit Climate 
Profile.  
Finally, it was clear that distinct patterns in how unit 
climate variables affected readiness were evident 
across different units.  This outcome appears to 
support current practice of conducting climate 
assessments on a unit basis in order to develop tailored 
information to optimise the human factors 
underpinning capability and operational effectiveness 
in those units.  
It would appear that there is no consistent ‘Holy 
Grail’ of antecedent factors that will ensure each unit 
will be optimally prepared in a psychological sense for 
deployment.  Psychological climate is a multifaceted 
attribute that is a function of perceptual, cognitive and 
emotional processes at multiple levels in the 
organisation.
An understanding of multilevel psychological climate 
information should enable commanders to enhance the 
human factors contributing to individual and unit 
readiness and effectiveness.  Therefore, it is recom-
mended that units routinely undertake a climate 
assessment in the lead-up to deployment (as well as 
during deployment).  In this way, the unique constella-
tion of human factors in that unit, at that time, can be 
assessed in order to inform command decision-making.  
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Russian Novelist Ivan Turgener
If we wait for the moment when 
everything, absolutely everything 
is ready, we shall never begin.
Senior leader Effectiveness was significant 
only in the two deployment samples.  A 
plausible explanation for this outcome is 
that members of the senior leadership 
generally are busy planning behind the 
scenes in the lead-up to deployment; but 
their role and influence are more apparent 
and accepted in the deployment context 
where their major focus is on day-to-day 
operations.
A supplementary explanation draws 
attention to the point we have made before 
in this article: these regression outcomes 
emphasise relative rather than absolute 
contributions. The correlation between 
senior leadership and collective readiness 
was still robust in the pre-deployment 
samples, but in the pre-deployment context 
its influence was overshadowed by Team 
Climate and SNCO/WO leadership.
The same comment applies to morale, 
which was inconsistent with respect to its 
influence as a predictor of psychological 
readiness, in this case readiness measured 
at the group level.  We hasten to point out 
that this finding does not lead to the 
conclusion that morale is unimportant. As 
was the case in the individual level analyses, 
morale was consistently related to readiness, 
so the theoretical links were supported. 
From a practical viewpoint, however, 
morale in this case did not add to the 
prediction of readiness when leadership and 
climate factors were also taken into 
consideration. Our research shows that they 
are better predictors of readiness than 
morale. Teasing out the role of morale will 
take more space than we have available 
here. We will address this question in a 
future volume of this series.
 COMMAnd LeSSOn 11: 
Group-level unit climate variables 
(Ethos, Team Climate, Senior 
Leadership Effectiveness and SNCO/
WO Effectiveness) were effective 
predictors of readiness to deploy.  
COMMAnd LeSSOn 12: 
Team Climate (horizontal cohesion) 
was the strongest and most consistent 
predictor of predeployment readiness; 
while Senior Leadership variables were 
strongly predictive of psychological 
readiness during the deployment 
phase.
conclusions
The study of Australian Army personnel 
from the Human Dimensions of Operations 
project showed that there were consistent, 
positive associations between psychological 
readiness and military experience, health and 
unit climate.  The human dimensions of unit 
climate were easily the most influential 
factors when trying to predict individual and 
collective readiness.  Overall, measures of 
horizontal cohesion (Cohesion and Team 
Climate) were the strongest and most 
consistent predictors of psychological 
readiness. 
Associations between unit climate 
constructs and perceptions of readiness at 
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 Figure 6.  Multiple regression predicting readiness for deployment from five unit climate 
factors. (Deployment sample, n=452)
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